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The view from Havana:  
Chilean Exiles in Cuba and Early Resistance to Chile’s Dictatorship, 1973-1977 
 
Two days after the Chilean military coup on 11 September 1973, the first left-wing 
Chilean exiles reached Cuba. By mid-1974, over a thousand had arrived.1 There, they 
received accommodation, food, healthcare, and work. However, the trauma of leaving 
Chile and seeing their country’s democratic Unidad Popular (UP) government and its 
president, Salvador Allende, overthrown was enormous. As Beatriz Allende – Salvador 
Allende’s daughter, a Chilean Socialist Party militant, and the first exile to arrive in Cuba 
– wrote to another Chilean in Mexico, exile was “bitter.”2  
The Chileans that arrived in Cuba shared this bitterness with over 200,000 other 
political exiles forced to flee Chile after the coup.3 Dispersed around the world, they not 
only had to deal with loss and uncertainty regarding their own futures, but also 
devastating news from Chile of the dictatorship’s repression. Within six months, 80,000 
people had been arrested and 160,000 had lost their jobs.4 Over the course of more than 
sixteen years in power, the regime killed over 3,000 Chileans and tortured more than 
40,000.5 Although many of those who managed to get asylum initially believed that exile 
would be temporary, it soon transpired that this was wrong.  
Unable to foresee what lay ahead, those arriving in Havana in late 1973 and early 
1974 focused on surviving and coming to terms with defeat. For many, this involved 
intense personal reflection of the past: what had gone wrong, why the UP had failed, and 
who was to blame. This was also true at a party level. For the left-wing parties in the UP 
government – the Communist Party (PCCH) the Socialist Party (PS), the Christian Left 
(MAPU), and the Radical Party (PR) – and for the Chilean far Left party outside the UP, 
the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), what followed was a period of profound 
                                                        
1 Numbers range from 1,300-1,400 by mid-1974. Report, Laura Brown, Subcommittee to Chile Solidarity 
Committee, “Meeting in Cuba with Beatriz Allende and other rep’s [sic] of UP resistance outside Chile,” 14 
May 1974, Folder 47, Box 35, Collection 132: “Communist Party of the United States of America,” 
Tamiment Library, New York, USA [Hereafter: 47/35/132/TAM]; Letter, Tati (Beatriz Allende) to Pillayo, 
30 August 1974, Archivo Beatriz Allende, Private Collection, Havana, Cuba [Hereafter: ABA]. In 1975, the 
Cubans referred to “more than 1,500” Chilean exiles. See Cable, Amembassy Caracas to SecState, 23 
October 1975, State Department Central Foreign Policy Files (1973-1977), National Archives and Records 
Administration, Access to Archival Databases: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/series-description.jsp?s=4073  
[Hereafter: CFP/DOS]. 
2 Letter, Tati to Jaime (Toha), 2 July 1975, ABA. 
3 Thomas C. Wright and Rody On ̃ate, “Chilean Political Exile,” in Exile and the Politics of Exclusion in the 
Americas, ed. Luis Roniger, James N. Green, and Pablo Yankelevich (Eastbourne; Portland, Or: Sussex 
Academic Press, 2012), 145. 
4 Kenneth M. Roberts, Deepening Democracy? The Modern Left and Social Movements in Chile and Peru (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1998), 94. 
5 “Chile Recognises 9,800 More Victims of Pinochet’s Rule,” BBC, 18 August 2011: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-14584095.   
questioning, recrimination, and adaptation at the same time as fighting for survival. As 
two psychologists describe, the initial phase of Chilean exile was shaped by “the trauma 
of departure, a feeling of loss and of pain characterized by a deep wound. And guilt.”6 
One way of dealing with these feelings was to channel them into fighting back. 
Indeed, the impulse to engage in political, revolutionary action against the Junta was 
strong. As leaders or members of Chilean left-wing parties, many exiles had served in the 
UP government and dedicated their lives to revolutionary change. Now, political 
commitments served to overcome “numbness.”7 The party, one Chilean recalled, became 
more central than ever: “militancy was the refuge and support” that allowed them to 
survive the “enormous loneliness of exile.”8 As a friend of Beatriz’s in exile wrote, the 
key was to “kill time and the imagination” and give “meaning” to life beyond “anguish of 
feeling far away and impotent.”9 This need to do something was widespread: exiles are 
“‘survivors,’ but to continue surviving they need to reproduce spaces that imitate the 
world they have lost,” psychologists Vásquez-Bronfman and Araújo argue. Political 
parties provided this framework; relationships between exiles were not conceived as 
being “between compatriots” but “militants.”10 
For left-wing militants, and particularly those on the far Left influenced by ideas 
of self-sacrifice associated with Latin America’s guerrilla decade, the risks of fighting the 
dictatorship were part of a commitment to revolutionary change. A belief in socialism (of 
one form or another) and a desire to help comrades back home drove them to enlist in 
resistance efforts. “I have to try and help in some way,” one exile living in Britain wrote 
to Beatriz, “not only as a result of conviction but also moral imperative. The ghosts of 
comrades…of your father, of so many people with so much hope that believed in us and 
that live, suffer and fight in Chile make it a moral obligation that can not be ignored.”11 
Another Chilean in Cuba recalled his sense of duty to his party: “To be a 
Socialist…meant proudly carrying a bag of duties…We had to demonstrate to Cuba, to 
                                                        
6 Ana Vásquez-Bronfman and Ana Maria Araújo, La maldición de Ulises : repercusiones psicológicas del exilio 
(Santiago, Chile: Editorial Sudamericana, 1990), 30–31, 208; Roniger, Green, and Yankelevich, Exile & the 
Politics of Exclusion, 151. 
7 Ariel Dorfman, Feeding on Dreams: Confessions of an Unrepentant Exile (Boston: Mariner Books/Houghton 
Mifflin Harcourt, 2011), 22. 
8 Luis Jerez Ramírez, Ilusiones y quebrantos: desde la memoria de un militante socialista (Santiago, Chile: Editorial 
Forja, 2007), 349. 
9 Letter, Hernán (Sandoval), Paris, to Tati, 7 November 1973, ABA. See also Loreto Rebolledo, Memorias 
del desarraigo: testimonios de exilio y retorno de hombres y mujeres de Chile (Santiago, Chile: Catalonia, 2006), 70. 
10 Vásquez-Bronfman and Araújo, La maldición de Ulises, 208. 
11 Letter, Pillayo to Tati, 11 June 1974, ABA.  
its revolution and its people that we were dignified followers of the President’s 
[Allende’s] example and that we would defeat fascism in Chile and [Latin] America.”12   
To manage these impulses among Chileans in Cuba and begin coordinating 
opposition to the dictatorship from abroad, Beatriz established the Comité Chileno de 
Solidaridad con la Resistencia Antifascista in Havana on 8 October 1973. Run by left-wing 
Chilean exiles in the name of the collective ‘Chilean Left’ and paid for by the Cuban 
government, this committee played an important role in focusing global opposition to 
Chile’s dictatorship in the first years after the coup. Until 1977, it was the most important 
center for solidarity campaigns in the Americas. Together with committees in Rome, 
Berlin and Moscow, the Comité Chileno in Havana was also a fundamental pillar – if not 
the fundamental pillar – in a global network that exiles established to fight back. 
Coordinating with other exiles, non-Chilean led solidarity campaigns, sympathetic 
governments, international organizations, and non-governmental groups, the Comité 
Chileno helped ensure that left-wing parties survived the first devastating years after the 
coup. Beatriz managed funds for ‘the resistance’ from Havana. The Comité Chileno’s 
staff meanwhile helped coordinate a campaign against the Chilean dictatorship at the 
United Nations. Chilean exiles in Cuba working also published a weekly Bulletin, which, 
by mid-1975, was distributed to over 400 solidarity committees, key personalities and 
organizations in the United States and Latin America.13 Indeed, the Comité Chileno, the 
global solidarity network it was part of, and the state-level Cuban support it received, 
were central features of early opposition to the dictatorship after 1973. 
Until now, however, the Comité Chileno’s role in this first phase of resistance to 
the dictatorship, and Cuba’s support for it, have received little attention. Beyond passing 
mention, the view from Havana and the significant role that Cuban-based opposition to 
the dictatorship played in the mid-1970s has been relatively ignored. It is generally 
accepted that, like other socialist bloc countries, Cuba offered covert support to the 
Chilean resistance. Most scholars who have touched on Cuba’s role have pointed to 
military training for armed resistance in Chile people have assumed that it provided. In 
many ways this seems logical. We know that Havana provided defensive armed training 
to Chilean left-wing parties before 1973 and that the Cubans helped train and infiltrate 
cadres from the PCCH and MIR back into Chile to take part in a new phase of armed 
                                                        
12 Email correspondence with Enrique San Martín González, 30 August 2013. 
13 Letter, Tati to Orlando Letelier, 11 June 1975, Document 27, Folder 16, Box 9, Fondo Orlando Letelier, 
Archivo Nacional, Chile [Hereafter: 27/16/9/FOL]. 
resistance in the late 1970s and 1980s.14 However, despite general suppositions, Cuba’s 
response to armed operations in the years immediately after the coup remains 
ambiguous. The broader significance of Cuba’s role, beyond military training, especially 
in these initial years, has meanwhile been overlooked.  
Instead, recent histories of Chilean solidarity campaigns have tended to focus on 
Western Europe, the Soviet bloc, Canada and the United States.15 Scholars who have 
focused on Latin America have not dealt with Cuba and Cuban-based exiles.16 There has 
also tended to be a division in historiography between studies of solidarity and exile 
dealing with culture, gender or human rights on the one hand and political histories of 
the Chilean Left on the other. Histories of solidarity and exile can therefore sometimes 
portray solidarity as if it was an end in itself: an apolitical, amorphous concept with no 
clear objective regardless of the obvious centrality politics had in driving exile-led 
resistance and broader solidarity campaigns with Chile.  
Drawing on new access to private collections, interviews, published testimonies, 
solidarity archives in Havana and New York, and declassified U.S. government 
documents, this article brings Cuba and the Comité Chileno squarely back into the 
picture. Contrary to traditional histories that painted exiles merely as victims and 
recipients of solidarity, it contributes to recent scholarship that emphasizes Chilean 
agency in coordinating, managing, and shaping opposition to the dictatorship.17 By 
focusing on the exiles who led the Comité Chileno, their priorities, and the effectiveness 
of strategies pursued by those in Havana, it also sheds light on the political dimensions 
of solidarity and exile. It provides a new perspective on what solidarity concretely 
entailed and how resistance (direct and indirect) from exile was conceived. Given the 
                                                        
14 Tanya Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2011), 233; Alan Angell, “International Support for the Chilean Opposition, 1973-1989: 
Political Parties and the Role of Exiles,” in The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the 
Americas, ed. Laurence Whitehead (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 180, 190. 
15 Kim Christiaens, Idesbald Goddeeris, and Magaly Rodriguez Garcia, eds., European Solidarity with Chile 
1970s - 1980s (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2014); Margaret Power, “The U.S. Movement in Solidarity with Chile 
in the 1970s,” Latin American Perspectives 36, no. 6 (2009): 46–66; Jose ́ del Pozo, ed., Exiliados, emigrados y 
retornados: chilenos en América y Europa, 1973-2004 (Santiago, Chile: RIL Editores, 2006); Olga Ulianova, “La 
Nueva Inserción Internacional Del Comunismo Chileno Tras El Golpe Militar,” in Chile Y La Guerra Fría 
Global, ed. Tanya Harmer and Alfredo Riquelme Segovia (Santiago, Chile: RIL Editores, 2014); Michal 
Zourek, Checoslovaquia Y El Cono Sur 1945-1989: Relaciones Políticas, Económicas Y Culturales Durante La Guerra 
Fría (Prague: Editorial Karolinum, Universidad Carolina de Praga, 2014). 
16 Roniger, Green, and Yankelevich, Exile and the Politics of Exclusion in the Americas; Jessica Stites Mor, 
Human Rights and Transnational Solidarity in Cold War Latin America (Madison, Wis.: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2013); Claudia Fedora Rojas Mira, “El Exilio Político Chileno: La Casa de Chile En 
México (1973-1993), Una Experiencia Singular” (Ph.D diss., USACH, 2013). 
17 Margaret Power, “The U.S. Movement in Solidarity with Chile”; Patrick William Kelly, “The 1973 
Chilean Coup and the Origins of Transnational Human Rights Activism,” Journal of Global History 8, no. 01 
(2013): 165–186. 
central role that the Comité Chileno in Havana played in distributing money raised by 
global solidarity campaigns, it also examines the clandestine supply of funds to the 
underground resistance in Chile.  
Cuba’s role in offering support, advice, and opposition to the dictatorship is also 
examined. The Cubans provided unique revolutionary authority, leadership, and logistical 
support. Fidel Castro and the head of Cuba’s Latin American operations, Manuel 
Piñeiro, had supported revolutionary movements in the region since 1959. They were 
respected and trusted, and they had extensive experience in clandestine operations. In the 
case of Chile, their long-standing relations with Salvador Allende, close ties with Chile’s 
left-wing parties, and active involvement in Chile during the UP government made 
Havana the obvious place for Chilean exiles to seek help.  
Evaluating the success of overt and clandestine solidarity during these first 
chaotic years of the dictatorship is nevertheless admittedly difficult. There is a lot we still 
do not know and are unlikely to know due to the nature of covert resistance and the lack 
of detailed record keeping. Cuba’s archives also remain closed. However, by piecing 
together testimonies of those who survived, private archives, and declassified documents, 
we can begin to draw significant conclusions about this early phase of opposition to the 
dictatorship, what characterized it, and what it was able to achieve. 
For example, this article argues that the Cubans did not advocate immediate 
armed insurgency against the dictatorship and were unenthusiastic about training exiles 
until the situation in Chile improved. However, the Cubans provided pivotal support in 
other ways. They paid for the Comité Chileno in Havana, facilitated Chilean left-wing 
party members’ travel, communication and money transfers, hosted meetings in Cuba, 
and helped coordinate international diplomatic campaigns against the dictatorship at the 
United Nations. Moreover, all Chilean left-wing parties were represented in Havana and 
had close relations with Fidel Castro, which meant that Cuba played a unique role in 
supporting ‘the Chilean Left’ as a whole, compared to other countries and sponsors that 
favored different parties whose politics corresponded with their own.  
What follows also contributes to our understanding of the broader 
internationalization of Chilean politics after 1973. Surviving the dictatorship and 
mounting resistance required assistance from governments, parties, and non-
governmental organizations. In this respect, Chilean exiles found receptive ears. The 
Chilean coup sparked sympathy around the world replacing solidarity with previous 
causes such as Brazil and Vietnam. Whether championing democracy, armed revolution, 
Soviet-style communism, Christian Democracy, or human rights, non-Chilean solidarity 
activists donated time, money and energy to the battle against the dictatorship.  
This internationalization of Chilean politics was directly linked to the Chilean 
Left’s actions. Exiles skillfully appealed to different audiences when mobilizing solidarity. 
The composition of Chilean committees, like the Comité Chile in Havana, was also 
important in attracting support. The fact that Beatriz Allende – Salvador Allende’s 
daughter and heir apparent – was in charge of the Comité Chileno gave it special status. 
That she controlled the money raised by solidarity campaigns was also important. 
Beyond her active role, Chilean left-wing parties represented by the committee were key. 
Because the majority of parties instructed their leaders to seek asylum after the coup, and 
because these parties had long-standing ties with analogous parties around the world 
before it, Chilean exiles received support that their counterparts fleeing the dictatorship 
in Argentina after 1976, for example, did not.18 Although the MIR initially instructed its 
members not to seek asylum, it could also count on support from similar revolutionary 
groups in the Southern Cone, as well as sympathy from the radical Left in Western 
Europe.  
In short, the Chilean Left inserted itself into global networks like never before. In 
this way, exiles were able to contribute to the development of global ideas beyond their 
own immediate environment such as the struggle for human rights and against U.S. 
support for dictatorial regimes. As well as being fought out in Chile itself, the struggle 
against the dictatorship, and the latter’s efforts to eradicate all its opponents, was 
therefore played out on an international stage.  
Even so, an examination of early Chilean exile-led efforts from Havana reveals 
that strategies of resistance were not neatly defined nor necessarily joined up. Different 
approaches evolved simultaneously in a flurry of activity aimed simply at responding to 
what had happened. As one Chilean exile who spent four months in Cuba recalled, “Our 
political line...was that we had to wage in Chile a battle on all fronts to get rid of the 
dictatorship: a political battle, an organizational battle, battles of all types, and, if possible, 
even military…One of the fronts was the diplomatic front, the front of world public 
opinion, and that front was the one most accessible for those of us in exile.”19  
                                                        
18 Pablo Yankelevich, “Exiles and the Argentine Diaspora: Issues and Problems,” in Exile and the Politics of 
Exclusion, 209. 
19 Maria Elena Carrera as quoted in Thomas C. Wright and Rody On ̃ate, Flight from Chile: Voices of Exile 
(Albuquerque, N.M.: University of New Mexico Press, 1998), 159. 
As a center of exile-led resistance, the Comité Chileno juggled all of these 
different threads of activity at once. This was not easy. In these first years after the coup, 
the challenge of overcoming defeat and the repressive power of the military dictatorship 
in Chile proved immense. Acute internal divisions within and between Chile’s left-wing 
political parties progressively undermined the idea of a collective opposition movement. 
And, ultimately, none of the strategies Chileans adopted achieved the goal of toppling 
the Junta, whose power was more consolidated than ever in 1977. Indeed, until local, 
mass opposition to the dictatorship broke out inside Chile towards the end of the 1970s 
and early 1980s, exiles were constrained in what they could do. As Beatriz wrote to the 
Socialist Party’s General Secretary, Carlos Altamirano, on 4 October 1977, “solidarity 
depends to a large extent on developments in Chile and from abroad it is impossible to 
force it.” 20  
Days later, after four years dedicated to the exile-led opposition from Havana, 
Beatriz committed suicide. Her death was a devastating blow to the Comité Chileno. 
Having relied largely on her direction, the link to her father, and her status in Cuba, it 
henceforth lost its centrality as a center of exile-led opposition to the dictatorship. There 
were also other reasons for its relevance fading in 1977. The Chilean-Mexican run Casa 
Chile in Mexico City, established in September 1974, increasingly took over from the 
Comité Chileno as the leading center of opposition to the Junta in the Americas from the 
late-1970s onward. With more regular financial resources, better communication links, 
and an international reach, it could play a role that the Comité Chileno could not. 
Following a change in leadership and organization in 1976, which resulted in the Radical 
Party leader, Hugo Miranda Ramírez directing it, and the formalization of its status in 
Mexico in 1978 as a “civil association,” the Casa Chile could also count on particularly 
close relations with the Mexican government.21 Along with the rise of Mexico City as the 
predominant capital of exile-led solidarity in the Americas, the collective Chilean Left 
that the Comité Chileno had aspired to represent disintegrated in the late 1970s. In 1979, 
the UP formally ceased to exist. The PCCH and the MIR adopted new strategies of 
armed insurgency in Chile from the late 1970s onwards.22 Meanwhile, a reformed part of 
                                                        
20 Letter, Tati to Altamirano, 4 October 1977, ABA. 
21  Rojas Mira, “El Exilio Político Chileno,” 121, 125–26, 133–35, 147. 
22 See Rolando Álvarez, “¿La noche del exilio? Los orígenes de la rebelión popular en el Partido Comunista 
de Chile” and Julio Pinto Vallejos, “¿Y la historia les dio la razón? El MIR en Dictadura, 1973-1981,” in Su 
revolución contra nuestra revolución. Vol.1: Izquierdas y derechas en el Chile de Pinochet (1973-1981), eds. Vero ́nica 
Valdivia Ortiz de Za ́rate, Rolando Álvarez, and Julio Pinto Vallejos (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2006); 
Victor Figueroa Clark, “The Forgotten History of the Chilean Transition: Armed Resistance Against 
Pinochet and US Policy toward Chile in the 1980s,” Journal of Latin American Studies, Forthcoming. 
PS, having formed in 1979, abandoned Marxism-Leninism and adopted European-style 
social democracy. The decreasing centrality of the Comité Chileno therefore coincided 
with the end of the first phase of collective left-wing opposition to the dictatorship, 
which would subsequently give way to new less centrally coordinated phases, divided by 
party affiliation and geography. 
Rather than dealing with reformulation and resistance in later years, what follows 
is an account of the first four chaotic and devastating years after the coup when the 
Comité Chileno’s influence and Cuba’s centrality in early resistance were at their height. 
These were bleak years for the Chilean Left. Yet this article argues that exile-led 
opposition during this period, facilitated by Cuba, laid the seeds for future phases of 
resistance. For all defeats suffered, the Comité Chileno’s activities, with Cuban support, 
helped Chilean left-wing parties to survive and remain viable so they could re-organize 
and develop new strategies of opposition in later years. They also had a direct impact on 
the Junta’s international standing. Chilean exiles in Cuba therefore had specific impact on 
the evolving contours of an ongoing battle for Chile. However, none of this happened 
automatically. For those arriving in Cuba in 1973, it entailed immense effort and 
dedication. 
 
SUPPORTING THE RESISTANCE   
 
As her father’s heir apparent and a long-time Socialist, it was logical that Beatriz Allende 
should play a leading role in fighting the dictatorship. It helped that she had personal 
relations with the Cuban government and could work with it to do so. Her husband 
since 1970, Luis Fernández Oña, was a Cuban intelligence officer who worked for 
Manuel Piñeiro’s Departamento General de Liberación Nacional at the Ministry of the Interior, 
the organization that oversaw and managed Cuba’s relations with Latin America. Beatriz 
had first met Oña, Castro and Piñeiro in Cuba in 1967, when she had visited the island 
with her father. Subsequently, between 1968 and 1970, with Cuban support, she and two 
other PS militants established a Chilean branch of the Bolivian Ejercito de Liberación 
Nacional (ELN) to support survivors of Che Guevara’s guerrilla column fleeing Bolivia 
and helped coordinate a new revolutionary insurgency in that country. Although this had 
failed by 1970, it meant that Beatriz had spent extensive time in Havana during the late 
1960s, receiving covert radio signaling training while also managing relations between the 
Cuban authorities and ELN members preparing to go to Bolivia. Between 1970 and 
1973, during her father’s presidency, she had then helped him coordinate relations with 
Cuba as one of his private secretaries and had visited the island often.23  
Besides having close ties with Cuba, Beatriz also commanded respect from 
Chile’s different left-wing parties. She had long-since identified with the far Left but had 
worked with all left-wing parties during her father’s presidency and had known many of 
their leaders since childhood. They also knew that her father respected and trusted her. 
That she did not hold a formal leadership role in the Socialist Party helped her transcend 
party differences within it, and straddle relations with all left-wing parties. She was 
therefore in an ideal position to coordinate resistance to the dictatorship. One of those 
who worked with her in Cuba remembered that “eighty percept of her attention, day in 
day out, was centered on the lucha.”24 As Beatriz would write to a fellow exile in Mexico, 
“not to rest a minute and to maximize initiatives that contribute to making the Junta’s 
life difficult is our basic duty.”25  
Beatriz established the Comité Chileno in this context. This was not the first 
exile-led organization after the coup. Already, on 11 September, a group of Chilean left-
wing leaders in Buenos Aires had begun coordinating ways to support their comrades 
back home. In Moscow, on 13 September 1973, the PCCH leader, Volodia Teitelboim, 
broadcast what would become a regular program – Escucha Chile (Listen Chile) – emitted 
by Radio Moscow back to Chile for those resisting the dictatorship. At the end of 
September, left-wing exiles in Europe had also met with democratic leaders in Rome and 
Helsinki to call for a worldwide solidarity campaign with Chile. The establishment of the 
Comité Chileno in Havana therefore mirrored these efforts to respond meaningfully to 
the coup.26 
What was initially more significant about the establishment of the Comité 
Chileno in Cuba, however, was that it served as the basis for a mid-October meeting of 
exiled representatives from the UP’s constituent parties and the MIR. During the 
previous three years, UP parties and the MIR had publically disagreed over strategies for 
moving Chile’s revolutionary process forward. The MIR, together with radical sectors of 
the PS and MAPU, had advocated moving beyond constitutional restraints, while the 
                                                        
23 Tanya Harmer, “Two, Three, Many Revolutions?: Cuba and the Prospects for Revolutionary Change in 
Latin America, 1967-1975,” Journal of Latin American Studies 45, no. 1 (2013): 67; Harmer, Allende’s Chile, 52; 
Gustavo Rodri ́guez Ostria, Sin tiempo para las palabras: Teoponte, la otra guerrilla guevarista en Bolivia 
(Cochabamba, Bolivia: Grupo Editorial Kipus, 2006). 
24 Interview with Francisco Fernández Fredes, 8 July 2013, Santiago, Chile. 
25 Letter, Tati to Jaime, 2 July 1975. 
26 Jorge Arrate and Eduardo Rojas, eds., Memoria de la izquierda chilena: Tomo II, 1970-2000 (Santiago, Chile: 
Javier Vergara Editor, 2003), 191, 258–59, 261. 
PCCH and other sectors of the PS, including Allende, had favored moderation and 
negotiations with center-left Christian Democrats. After the coup, the MIR’s 
commitment to immediate armed resistance with support from the radical wing of the PS 
and MAPU then clashed with the PCCH’s decision to go underground.27  
The decision at this meeting in Havana in mid-October 1973 to establish a 
formal group that would bring all parties together to coordinate opposition to the 
dictatorship in the name of ‘the Chilean Left’ was therefore immensely significant. The 
Izquierda Chilena en el Exterior, as it called itself, did not, and could not, dictate strategies to 
individual parties. It also could not mask the continuing divisions between and within 
them. But it did hope to provide a unified voice and coordination when it came to 
dealing with the outside world and promoting solidarity. While exiled PCCH and PS 
leaderships would set up their own headquarters in Moscow and Berlin respectively, this 
collective grouping of the Chilean Left chose an office in Rome, named Chile Democrático, 
as its headquarters. In practice, however, it decided on a global division of labor: Rome 
would coordinate solidarity campaigns in Europe, while the Comité Chileno in Havana 
would manage relations in the Americas and handle finances. In the years that followed, 
similar Chilean exile committees were established, including those in Mexico City (Casa 
Chile), Caracas (Comité de Solidaridad) and Algiers (Algiers Committee). However, all of 
these committees formed in the name of the Chilean Left by Chileans in the initial years 
after the coup would ultimately coordinate their activities with Rome or Havana, 
depending on which was closer.28  
Although they worked together, the Rome and Havana offices had different 
characters due to their interactions with hosts and the politics of their members. Both 
adopted the label of “anti-fascism” to denote and encourage broad-based collective 
opposition to the dictatorship. Indeed, Fidel Castro had labeled the Junta very quickly as 
“fascist,” referring to evidence of the military’s admiration of European-style fascism, 
and underlining the need for broad-based resistance.29 Soviet bloc regimes and Western 
Europeans also emphasized the parallels between “resistance” during World War II and 
opposition to the Junta. Not only did they want to encourage collective opposition to the 
                                                        
27 Ibid., 176, 212. 
28 Ibid., 270. 
29 Fidel Castro, “Castro Banquet Speech,” Hanoi, 13 September 1973; “Fidel Castro Addresses CDR 
Anniversary Ceremony,” Havana, 28 September 1973, Fidel Castro Speech Database, Latin American 
Network Information Centre: http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/castro.html 
dictatorship, but parallels also resonated well with local populations.30 The idea of “the 
resistance” modeled on anti-Nazi campaigns in Europe caught on inside Chile as well, 
with the capital “R” being painted on walls and public places.31 However, the goal of 
constructing an anti-fascist resistance front, including non-left-wing sectors like Chile’s 
centrist Christian Democrat Party (PDC) was complicated. In Italy, under the label of 
anti-fascism, Chilean exiles, belonging mostly to the PCCH, MAPU and the moderate 
sectors of the PS, worked with the Italian Communist Party, which in turn emphasized 
cooperation with Italian Christian Democrats.32 Left-wing members of the Chilean PDC 
who opposed the dictatorship also relocated to Italy and collaborated with Chile 
Democrático office. However, the mainstream PDC leadership in Santiago rejected 
appeals to form an anti-fascist front until 1977, refusing to work with the PCCH. In 
Havana, where links to non-left-wing parties were more tenuous, anti-fascism was 
conceived more as militant resistance combining Chilean left-wing parties but aiming to 
support all sectors in Chile opposed to the dictatorship regardless of class and party 
affiliations. Even in this variation, the idea of anti-fascism was nevertheless contentious, 
with the first PCCH and PS post-coup declarations from inside Chile embracing the idea 
and the MIR resisting the notion of working with non-left-wing sectors.33 
Problematic as the notion of anti-fascism was, it was widely used during these 
early years of the dictatorship and the Comtié Chileno adopted it specifically to call for 
collective opposition. Run by a Secretariat formed of representatives from seven Chilean 
left-wing parties,  including the MIR, the committee was presided over by an Executive, 
consisting of Beatriz Allende as General (or Executive) Secretary and, below her, the PS 
militant and former First Secretary of the Chilean embassy in Havana, Francisco 
Fernández, as its president.34 By early 1975, it had twenty-five full time staff, who 
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received salaries from the Cuban state-run organization, the Instituto Cubano de Amistad con 
los Pueblos.35 
One of the Comité Chileno’s first tasks was to look after Chilean exiles in Cuba 
and provide a channel of communication between them and Cuban authorities. Arriving 
with very little, exiles needed housing, food, and work. Yet Havana did not have housing 
complexes immediately available, or ample resources to offer. This led to tensions, with 
the Comité Chileno forced to mediate. More problematically, as Francisco Fernández 
recalled, was the tension caused by exiles’ demand for training and assistance to return to 
Chile covertly to take part in an insurgency against the dictatorship.36 Given the Cubans’ 
armed revolutionary focus in the past, these demands were unsurprising. Allende’s 
former secretary, Patricia Espejo, was responsible for “interviewing” all Chileans who 
arrived in Havana to ensure the dictatorship was not infiltrating spies and recalled the 
“majority wanted to train to return to Chile.”37 Francisco Fernández also remembers 
exiles were “very impatient…they believed it was simply a case of being in Cuba three or 
four months to receive training and then returning to incorporate themselves into the 
struggle.”38  
However, what is interesting – and what caused problems between exiles and 
their hosts – is that, at least in the immediate post-coup years, the Cubans were reticent 
to coordinate an armed insurgency in Chile. True, in public pronouncements after the 
coup, Castro referred to a future insurgency against the dictatorship. Chile showed 
“revolutions are not made with people alone; arms are also needed,” he underlined on 28 
September, speaking of “the hard and bloody struggle which the Chilean people will have 
to wage.” But he left details vague and warned against hopes of immediate success: 
 
We are absolutely certain that they [the Chilean people] will know how to 
confront fascism…We are absolutely certain that 11 September was the 
beginning of a struggle which will end only with the victory of the people. This 
will not occur immediately. Do not expect miracles in the Chilean situation. The 
people have been badly beaten and the parties and organizations will have to 
recover from the fascist blow.39  
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 It was in this context the Chilean exiles in Havana asked unsuccessfully asked for Cuba’s 
help. Allende’s former director of Chile’s Development Agency (CORFO), the Socialist 
and economist, Jorge Arrate, is one of those who remembered being denied training in 
Cuba. Based on his performance at a firing range, the Cubans did not see him as a 
promising guerrilla. To his disappointment, they advised him that his linguistic abilities 
(English and French) made him more suited to international political work. He 
subsequently left for Rome to become Director of Chile Democrático.40  
International observers grasped the Cubans’ reluctance to engage in an armed 
insurgency in Chile. As the British embassy in Havana reported: “Whilst Chile is now 
clearly relegated to the group of countries in which the armed struggle can be the only 
policy…[Castro] gave no indication that Cuba intended to swing back to the old Che 
Guevara line of out-and-out support for the armed struggle.”41 The CIA similarly 
observed in mid-1974 that Havana’s leaders were “not sanguine about the prospects of 
converting the Chilean exiles into guerrilla fighters.” Although they ultimately favored 
armed revolution against the dictatorship, believed force would be needed, and trained 
“some exiles…for eventual infiltration into Chile,” they were “cautious about the time 
and place. They feel the Chilean people must first tire of the Junta and its policies.”42  
The fragility of the resistance inside Chile explains this reluctance to commit to 
an insurgency. The PCCH had prioritized the need to preserve its organization and, 
where leaders had not been detained as was the case with the Party’s General Secretary, 
Luis Corvalán, it had sent them abroad, leaving a clandestine structure inside the country. 
By the end of 1973, this structure had established itself. Regular communication between 
it and those in exile was established with help from East German and Czechoslovakian 
intelligence services.43 However, the “interior” PCCH had extremely limited room to 
maneuver. Leaders were forced to assume four or five different identities and focused on 
surviving, sharing information censored by the Junta with Party militants, and supporting 
prisoners and their families.44  
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Meanwhile, the MIR, the party that initially dismissed exile and committed to 
immediate armed resistance, suffered serious setbacks from December 1973 as a result of 
the dictatorship’s targeted repression, forcing it to retreat.45 Although it had launched 
small, isolated armed campaigns in poblaciones and industrial zones in Santiago in the 
immediate weeks after the coup, these were “precarious.”46 As a member of the MIR 
explained, “There wasn’t much space…to live peacefully even for a single night.”47 
Another mirista lamented that, in spite of their readiness to fight, the party’s members 
“knew very little or nothing really about the military problem.”48 By mid-1974, the MIR 
had lost 40 per cent of its original Political Commission and Central Committee. A year 
later, after further arrests and disappearances, only 2 members of the Political 
Commission remained, while 90 per cent of its Central Committee members had been 
killed, including its Secretary General Miguel Enriquez, who had been killed in a battle 
with Chilean security forces.49  
The PS had its own problems adapting to clandestine operations. Almost 
immediately, its structure inside Chile collapsed. Within six months of the coup, four of 
the Party’s 47-member Central Committee were killed and 12 others were imprisoned. 
Seven regional political secretaries were also killed and 20 detained.50 Only ten members 
of the Central Committee remained operational inside Chile during the first six months 
but all of these would be detained, killed or go into exile by the mid-1970s.51 Having 
escaped Chile, the Party’s Secretary General, Carlos Altamirano, appeared in Havana in 
January 1974 before moving to Berlin, where he set up the headquarters of the external 
branch of the PS. Communicating with underground PS members back home, and 
establishing a direct line of hierarchy, was nevertheless difficult. Having traditionally 
included different ideological tendencies within it and demanded less vertical and 
organizational discipline than the PCCH, it proved almost impossible for PS to establish 
a unified internal leadership let alone a clear relationship between PS structures inside 
and outside Chile. By early 1974, two different underground factions had established 
themselves: the “Dirección Interna” and the “Coordinadora Nacional de Regionales” 
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(CNR), both of which received support from the PS in exile.52 Thus, as Kenneth Roberts 
writes, “while Socialist militants were very active in grass-roots social resistance, their 
work was relatively decentralized and autonomous and often lacked political 
coordination.”53  
When it came to communicating with them, the situation was also extremely 
difficult. In mid-January 1974 Beatriz wrote to Altamirano asking him to select two 
trusted cadres to undergo communications training to help exiles maintain contact with 
counterparts in Chile.  From her own experience in the late 1960s – and no doubt with 
Cuban advice  – she spelt out the need for urgent training in radio reception, coding, 
invisible writing, security, photography of documents, and inlays. “Ideally”, she wrote, 
communication would happen by telegraphy but training would take six months and the 
Chilean Left did not have time: communications had to be “guaranteed” “immediately” 
and conducted with “measures of extreme security”.54 On the eve of the first anniversary 
of the coup, problems persisted. “From Chile we know little,” she wrote (un-coded) to 
an exile in Britain, “the news from the PS is contradictory and not very 
encouraging…the PCCH, it seems, is the most recuperated and finishing its 
reorganization…The MIR has also received hard blows.”55 Around the same time, the 
CIA reported that communication was “only occasional…across borders,” causing 
serious “problems and frictions” within parties. The “efficiency and alertness of Chilean 
security forces have made communications between comrades at home and those in exile 
very difficult and dangerous,” analysts concluded.56  
Cuba’s reluctance to train large numbers of Chilean exiles to fight for the 
resistance must be read in this context. When, in June 1974, Fidel Castro invited the 
PCCH to send a group of cadres to train with Cuba’s armed forces, he did so in response 
to the Party’s goal of preparing soldiers to eventually serve in the Chilean army after the 
fall of the dictatorship, not as guerrilla fighters for immediate infiltration into Chile.57 
From mid-1975 Cuba also provided training for selected PS cadres and the MIR but at 
this stage Castro continued to believe that Chile had “no conditions for civil war.”58 
Indeed, when one exile in Cuba asked Piñeiro for his future prognosis, he was shocked 
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to hear Piñeiro say that the dictatorship would last at least five or ten years; it “was like a 
jug of cold water,” this exile recalled.59 As Ulises Estrada, a Cuban intelligence officer, 
explained decades later, although there were militarily trained PCCH, PS and MIR cadres 
in Cuba, “we couldn’t send them to Chile because there was no way of entering or of 
receiving them. The internal resistance movement was very fragile…it was very hard, and 
if they had gone they would have had to fight against the Junta without the [right] 
conditions. Morale would have fallen.” In these early years, those that did receive training 
were therefore stuck in Havana waiting for things to improve. “To create the conditions 
could take your life,” Estrada recalled, “there were conditions [later]…but at the 
beginning it was crazy.”60 
The Cubans therefore encouraged the Comité Chileno to focus on supporting 
what resistance existed in Chile from afar. The committee’s primary aim was therefore to 
“boost and develop solidarity with the people’s struggle.” To this end, it pledged “all its 
resources, energy and creativity to the moral, material and political support.”61  As a 
fellow Socialist militant wrote to Beatriz, “While I remain abroad (I hope this is for a 
very short time), my only objective is to support the interior, in whatever way I can.”62 
Opposing the dictatorship from exile, in other words, meant practicing active solidarity, 
which involved helping comrades survive, escape repression, maintain or reorganize 
clandestine party structures, reconnect with their members, and begin mobilizing broad-
based opposition. Left-wing underground leaders articulated various priorities in this 
regard. Having established itself at the beginning of 1974, the PS Dirección Interna’s 
Central Committee issued a document in March that pointed to an “initial phase” of 
opposition consisting of  “political struggle” that would later provide conditions for a 
final phase including armed struggle. In this initial phase, the reorganization of a 
centralized party along Marxist-Leninist lines and “activation of a mass movement” were 
considered vital. Specifically, the Central Committee called for “political initiatives” to 
demonstrate that it had not been defeated, give “the masses confidence,” and “confront 
the dictatorship’s immense ideological and advertising power.” In the wake of the 
repression and the fragility of party structures these were ambitious priorities. The 
Central Committee planned to “educate the people to defend themselves from 
repression,” “agitate all the problems the masses felt,” “convince those who were 
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vacillating, denounce traitors,” rebuild Chile’s trade union movement, organize rural 
communities, channel student and intellectual sectors’ resistance, and attract all those 
who were discontented with the Junta to a broad Anti-Fascist Front. To do this it 
recognized the need to guarantee Human Rights, end the state of siege, and restore 
public freedoms and political rights. And for all these tasks, the Dirección Interna 
considered solidarity from abroad as being of “primary importance” to help “create the 
conditions for the political, economic and diplomatic isolation of the military regime”. 
“This solidarity that the Chilean people recognize and are thankful for, should be 
sustained and stimulated,” PS underground leaders urged.63 
Primarily, this job fell on Chilean exiles abroad. The Comité Chileno in Havana 
paid particular attention to coordinating its efforts with non-Chilean run campaigns and 
mobilizing their support. As notes on the Comité Chileno made for the US based 
National Coordinating Centre for Solidarity with Chile underlined: 
 
The committee [Comité Chileno] urges that the main interest of Solidarity 
Committees be to intensify within each country activities of support, and to use all 
available media to make the public aware of the situation in Chile. There are 4 
fundamental areas of concern, making up 4 demands 
1. Stop the murder and torture in Chile 
2. Free all political prisoners 
3. Guarantee the free passage of all people in embassies who want to leave Chile  
4. Stop throwing people out of work…64 
 
As well as simply raising awareness, the Comité Chileno focused on raising financial 
support. While exiles tended to be supported by host governments and affiliated parties, 
money was deemed particularly important for hiring lawyers for those in prison, 
supporting clandestine party members, providing assistance with food and 
accommodation for those who had lost their jobs, and for families of the dead, 
disappeared, or imprisoned. Accordingly, Chilean left-wing party representatives that met 
in Havana in October 1973 had agreed that Beatriz should manage a central solidarity 
fund for Chile from Cuba. True, some money for Chile raised abroad was given directly 
and separately to different Chilean parties. For example, the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union and the United States gave money directly to the PCCH,65 and the 
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Argentine revolutionary group, the Ejercito Revolucionaria del Pueblo (ERP), was believed by 
the CIA to have been handed $3 million in ransom money directly to the MIR.66 Non-
government organizations such as the World Council of Churches also sent hundreds of 
thousands of dollars directly to the Comité para la Cooperación para la Paz that had been set 
up by the Church officials in Chile to assist prisoners, refugees, and victims of human 
rights abuses.67 However, for the most part, money raised around the world in the name 
of solidarity between 1974 and 1977– by Chileans and non-Chileans alike – was 
transferred to a centralized bank account in Havana managed by Beatriz named 
“CUBALSE-12.”68 By early 1974, this money arrived in Cuba via a central account in 
Luxembourg. Monies collected by US solidarity campaigns were also sent to Cuba via 
Mexico from May 1974 onwards.69 
Although there is still much to learn about this account, available sources reveal 
that there was a lot of money to be shared out. “We became a money-generating 
machine,” one exile who was involved in fundraising remembered years later.70 This may 
not have seemed enough. Beatriz often wrote about the “bitter sensation” of sending only 
a “drop of water” compared to what was needed.71 However, worldwide solidarity 
campaigns raised hundreds of thousands of dollars, which were then given to the Chilean 
Left to send back to Chile.  
This financial support came from a range of sources. Locally based solidarity 
committees sold tickets to events or collected individual small donations at the door that 
soon added up. As one exile in Denmark who was involved in running Chilean music 
nights and selling empanadas remembered, raising money to send back to Chile was a 
“number one” priority.72 Other campaigns were on a larger scale. In the United States the 
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom and Amalgamated Meat Cutters 
and Workmen of North America union ran a joint campaign in twenty-five cities in 1975 
to raise $50,000 for the “struggle for democracy, against fascism” via what it explicitly 
called the Chilean Left’s “international office for financial assistance” managed by Beatriz 
in Cuba. “Funds are needed to defend 6,000 political prisoners,” a flyer for the campaign 
noted, as well as the “fundamental task of reorganizing popular movements in Chile, for 
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the distribution of news and information…”73 Meanwhile, Salvador Allende’s widow was 
one of many left-wing Chilean leaders who were paid fees for speaking tours (although 
Beatriz very often wrote her speeches with help from Francisco Fernández at the Comité 
Chileno).74  
By early 1974, Chilean diplomats calculated French solidarity campaigns had 
already raised 1,250,000 francs and the CIA noted West German groups had raised 
$50,000 with British groups donating an additional $35,000.75 The Swedish Prime 
Minister, Olaf Palme publicly handed 500,000 coronas (c. $100,000) raised by workers’ 
groups to Beatriz for the “resistance” when she visited Stockholm at the end of 1973.76 
According to CIA reports, the Iraqi B’ath party donated $10,000 to the Chilean Left and 
the Algerian government gave $50,000 to a local committee of exiles in Algiers linked to 
Rome to buy weapons from Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.77 Although it is difficult to 
verify these figures, Beatriz’s correspondence proves that the balance for the CUBALSE-
12 account remained healthy during the mid-1970s, ranging from $350,000 (March 1975) 
to $507,494 (July 1975), $80,000 (February 1976) and $106,060 (October 1977). In 2015, 
the combined total of these balances would be close to $5 million.78 It was an 
exaggeration but therefore not entirely inaccurate when one Chilean exile wrote, “In 
Chile we had a thousand times fewer resources when we were in government, than we 
have abroad as exiles.”79  
From Havana, Beatriz shared money in the CUBALSE-12 account out among 
the Chilean Left’s different parties for transfer to clandestine cadres back home. By 
August 1974, the CIA had a clear understanding of this arrangement, observing that the 
Cubans and the PCCH had proposed it in February 1974 and calculated shares based on 
trade union elections before the coup. Both the PS and PCCH were to be allocated 30 
per cent with the PR receiving ten per cent and the remainder going to the MIR and two 
of the other small parties that had made up the UP. After the MIR complained to the 
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Cubans, this changed: the MIR joined the PS and PCCH in receiving 30 per cent and the 
PR and two smaller parties received the rest.80 The PS’ money was also held in a bank 
account in Cuba managed by Beatriz named SIBONEY-10.81 In the case of the PS, for 
which partial records exist, Beatriz sent at least $200,000 (almost $1 million in 2015 
equivalents) back to Chile between 1974 and 1977 under the Party’s instructions.82  
What happened to this money once it reached Chile and what impact it had is 
less clear. As expected, Beatriz received confirmation that some of it had been shared out 
in small amounts between families of clandestine party members and relatives of those 
detained for food, medical bills, or lawyers.83 Money also covered costs of 
accommodation, transport, and false documentation for underground cadres.84 However, 
often, the most Beatriz knew was simply that the money had got to Chile, and even then 
rumors circulated that money was not reaching the right people. “If something worries 
me,” Beatriz wrote to her aunt, Laura Allende, who was exiled in early 1975, “it is 
hearing that ‘money doesn’t arrive’, ‘that inside [Chile] comrades are dying of hunger,’ 
‘that there are still no secure channels to send money,’ that ‘no one receives anything’ 
and to know that the Party has money in its account although it is not much.” Moreover, 
she regretted that uncertainty, together with what she saw as insufficient gratitude by left-
wing parties, was creating “a climate of mistrust” within the global solidarity movement.85  
Beyond having little control over the money that reached Chile, divisions 
between and within left-wing parties undermined the idea of solidarity with the resistance.  
For as much as the Chilean Left purported to coordinate solidarity efforts, each party 
was divided regarding the coup’s causes and appropriate strategies of resistance. Dealing 
with defeat involved first accounting for what had happened, which took up time and 
energy in these early years. Criticism, self-criticism, and acute recriminations between and 
within parties ensued. The PCCH blamed “ultraleftists” (i.e. radical sectors of the PS and 
the MIR) for having provoked the coup and alienated potential support for the UP. 
Seeing the coup primarily as the result of political failures, it emphasized political 
resistance had to take precedence. The MIR pointed to the military problem and the 
UP’s “reformism” (the PCCH’s in particular) as having caused the coup, thereby 
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advocating armed struggle.86 In this context, formulating coherent strategies for opposing 
the dictatorship were understandably difficult. Until 1980, the PCCH opposed closer 
relations with the MIR and “ultraleftist” armed resistance, while the MIR argued that 
only armed struggle would overthrow the dictatorship. These disagreements between the 
PCCH and the MIR translated into arguments related to solidarity campaigns’ emphasis 
that became “verbally violent.”87  
The PS, meanwhile, spent the first few years after the coup turning in on itself 
and criticizing its own position before the coup. Based on how they interpreted the past, 
different factions disputed the efficacy of armed action, the structure of the party, and 
future priorities.88 Differences between cadres inside Chile and those in exile caused a 
leadership crisis so extreme that the Party split in two at the end of the 1970s. The fact 
that the external PS leadership continued to support both underground PS factions in 
Chile until 1976, sending them both money, confused the picture.89 As the exiled PS 
leader in Berlin, Rolando Calderón, wrote to the Party’s representative in Havana, “It will 
not be possible to overthrow the fascist Junta without unity.”90 The Cubans also 
emphasized unity for resistance efforts. At a speech to commemorate the founding of 
the PS in 1975, Piñeiro stated categorically that the Party had to “achieve unity in leading 
the struggle.” If an “anti-fascist front is centered on the cohesion of the parties of the 
Chilean left,” he added, “the first great goal of the struggle will have been reached.”91 Yet 
repeated commitments to work together against the dictatorship either within the PS or 
on the Chilean Left did not match reality. As Arrate, who managed Chile Demócratico, 
wrote to the Socialist and former diplomat recently exiled after detention on Dawson 
island, Orlando Letelier, in June 1975, “you cannot imagine how worn out I am after 
having done this job for nearly two years. Worn out basically by internal discussion and 
having played the role of mediator that is psychologically destructive.”92  
Meanwhile, the dictatorship continued its effective targeting of left-wing parties 
in Chile, which made it difficult for exiles abroad to influence the situation back home. 
As CIA analysts had observed in August 1974, “The resistance groups [outside Chile] 
have the capacity to cause the Chilean government considerable difficulty and 
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embarrassment, but until they develop an internal capability in Chile, they will pose no 
real threat to the stability of the regime.”93 “The Chilean authorities are in complete 
control of the internal situation,” the U.S. State Department observed a year later.94 
Without support from abroad, the situation inside Chile for clandestine left-wing 
parties would arguably have been worse. As it was, 1975-77 were desperate, catastrophic 
years. The PCCH’s clandestine party structure inside Chile survived the longest of all 
left-wing parties after the coup but was successfully targeted by the military in May and 
December 1976, forcing retreat and reorganization.95 Henceforth, as Olga Ulianova 
writes, its activity in Chile was “practically paralyzed” for months and contact with its 
leaders in exile became “sporadic, uncertain and limited to minimum informational 
telegrams.”96 With the MIR’s pre-1973 leadership decimated by 1975 and surviving 
members of the Central Committee in exile, miristas inside Chile managed to continue 
resisting the dictatorship, but turned to political and social forms of doing so (i.e., the 
distribution of clandestine pamphlets, the reproduction of newspapers, graffiti, trade 
union activity, and cultural or sporting activities).97  
For the Socialist party, meanwhile, targeted repression in June 1975 spelt 
increasing difficulties. As Beatriz wrote to Altamirano in July that year, there was new 
money available in CUBALSE-12, but after the detention and disappearance of the 
Dirección Interna’s leadership, comprising Exequiel Ponce, Carlos Lorca, and Ricardo 
Lagos Salinas, the question was who to send it to. Suspending money transfers until she 
received further instructions, Beatriz urged the PS to improve its strategies: “accumulated 
hatred should make us more efficient in all areas,” she wrote.98 By November 1975, she 
was still urging Altamirano to “work seriously to create a climate of efficiency and trust, 
so as not to harm our comrades in Chile…the need for money is too drastic.” The Party 
“needs lots of money to fight,” she wrote, noting that she had recently managed to get a 
further $20,000 to Argentina and a total of $70,000 to Peru for transfer to Chile.99 
While Beatriz received news that money reached Buenos Aires and Lima, these 
routes for sending it to Chile were nevertheless progressively “burnt.”100 In December 
                                                        
93 Memorandum, “Anti-Junta Activity.” 
94 Briefing Memorandum, ARA (William D. Rogers) to Henry Kissinger, “Analysis of GOC Action in 
Barring Scheduled Visit by UN Human Rights Commission Working Group” in Cable, SecState to U.S. 
Del. Secretary, 10 July 1975, CFP/DOS. 
95 Memoria, 238. 
96 Ulianova, “Corvalán for Bukovsky,” 324, 334. 
97 Memoria, 259; “¿Y la historia les dio la razón?” 176–77, 180–82. 
98 Letter, Tati to Altamirano, 21 July 1975. 
99 Letter, Tati to Altamirano, 6 November 1975. 
100 Letter, Tati to Orlando, 30 December 1975, 8/17/3/FOL.  
1975, for example, the Argentine police seized the $20,000 that Beatriz had sent from a 
safety deposit box. When the man looking after this money was arrested, the police 
revealed they had successfully infiltrated the Chilean network in Argentina responsible 
for communicating with Chile since April. As a result of mistakes made by those 
travelling back and forth from Chile and the monitoring of weekly phone calls between 
Argentina and Europe, the police had detailed information about the networks using 
Buenos Aires to connect with Santiago. “The policeman – laughing – told me that he 
even had instructions of how to make contact in Chile written down,” the Chilean 
arrested later wrote to Beatriz. The Argentine police did not particularly care what the 
Chileans were up to, they told him, but were acting on the Chilean Junta’s orders. Having 
been released on the condition that he pay a further $20,000, the man caught up in the 
middle of this, lamented the “irresponsibility” of those who had led the police to the 
money.101  
Irresponsible or not, Argentina was becoming increasingly unsafe for left-wing 
exiles and would become even more dangerous after the military coup there in March 
1976. The inauguration of a formalized state-sponsored intelligence network between 
dictatorships in the Southern Cone under the name of Operation Condor in late 1975 
also heightened the precarious security of revolutionary groups in the Southern Cone.  
Even before Operation Condor, the CIA had a good understanding of money transfers 
across the Andes through “isolated passes,” money being “funneled” through Peru, and 
the internal dynamics of Chilean left-wing parties.102 The Chilean military regime also had 
good intelligence outside the region on broader Chilean-led solidarity efforts and support 
for clandestine party operations. As early as March 1974, for example, the Chilean 
ambassador in Paris could count on at least two Chilean informants with access to exile 
groups. He was able to send handwritten notes from a private French Comité de 
Solidaridad meeting, correspondence between this group, Chile Democrático and the 
Comité Chileno in Havana, and arrangements for money transfers to Cuba and Beatriz’s 
overall control of funds back to Santiago.103 Although we know more about the 
dictatorship’s repression and Operation Condor in later years, the level of detail that the 
dictatorship’s representatives abroad were able to gather from informants in this case 
alone is startling. Its surveillance obviously undermined the efficacy of Chilean left-wing 
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exiles’ opposition to the dictatorship and thwarted momentum when it came to 
reorganization, recuperation, and greater support for the resistance back home. 
It is unclear how much Chilean exiles knew with regards to the dictatorship’s 
infiltration and surveillance of their activities in the early years after the dictatorship. 
Suspicion and knowledge grew, but the extent of the Junta’s reach appears to have been 
underestimated to begin with on. By early 1977, Beatriz was expressing deep frustration 
at mistakes that had been made. “We cannot continue being such huevones…and go down 
the route of repeating errors, irreparable losses and handing over information that is too 
valuable for our precarious situation” she urged a fellow exile in Mexico.104  
For their part, the Cubans were preoccupied with security early on and had been 
concerned about Chilean left-wing exiles’ conduct.105 They were particularly worried 
about the risks their Chilean comrades were taking in meeting each other abroad. Having 
expended considerable resources to fly one Chilean exile from Lima to Havana via 
Bogota, Zurich, Paris, Prague, and Moscow so his destination would be undetected by 
Peruvian authorities in early 1974, the Cubans must have been furious when a fellow 
Chilean spoke openly about his arrival to a Peruvian diplomat in Cuba.106 Following a 
series of meetings and phone calls at the Cuban embassy in Paris between exiles a year 
later that raised suspicions from the French security services – including a meeting 
between Beatriz and the MIR’s leader, Edgardo Enriquez, who would later disappear in 
Argentina – Cuba’s Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez protested. “You 
know that when it comes to revolutionary principles we have never wavered in putting 
the fortune of our Revolution in danger for the cause of international solidarity,” he 
wrote, “However, I think that you will understand that there are unnecessary things that 
can be arranged in other ways. A confrontation with the French government for non-
essential reasons [over Cuba’s use of its embassy in Paris for obvious revolutionary 
meetings between far Left Chilean exiles], far from benefiting the Chilean cause, would 
impede our collaboration with it.”107  
Indeed, in these years following the coup, instead of encouraging armed 
insurgency and militant actions as might have been expected at the height of the guerrilla 
decade of the 1960s, the Cubans urged caution and restraint. To be sure, the Comité 
Chileno acknowledged it was reliant on the Cubans’ “generosity” and “militant 
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internationalism.”108 Cuba’s leaders offered their embassies around the world to exiles in 
Havana as a means of fast, safe communication, delivering letters by diplomatic pouch. 
The Cuban delegation at the United Nations also posted letters for Chilean exiles in 
Cuba using US post boxes.109 And the choice of Peru as a route for sending money back 
to Chile was probably at least in part to do with the Cuban embassy there at the time. 
Cuban diplomats in Lima definitely passed correspondence between Beatriz and exiles 
based there.110 However, mostly, the Cubans pressed the Chilean Left to re-group, re-
organize, unite, and wait for improved conditions in Chile. They also emphasized 
international activities to isolate the Junta from abroad, which exiles were already 
developing. Returning to fight against the dictatorship still remained the ultimate 
objective for many left-wing exiles. However, in the context of heavy losses and internal 
divisions between and within parties, the campaign to isolate the Junta internationally 
proved far less controversial and effective in this early phase of resistance.  
 
DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTIONARIES  
 
The international stage – and the United Nations in particular – has historically been an 
important battlefield for revolutionaries fighting against superior military forces. Using 
reports on Human Rights abuses, regular published Bulletins, and international 
conferences as weapons, exiles aimed to politically, diplomatically, economically, 
militarily, and culturally isolate the Junta,111 This, in turn, meant working within 
international organizations, extensive travel, and disseminating news about Chile as 
widely as possible.  
Left-wing leaders had realized the potential strengths of a diplomatic campaign 
against the Junta early on. As the exiled Socialist Party Senator, Maria Elena Carrera, 
wrote to Beatriz two months after the coup, foreign criticism – particularly from Western 
Europe – was “the only thing that the beasts fear.” By contrast, the military did not 
appear to care about opinions from the socialist bloc, which they regarded as inevitably 
hostile and were not reliant on for trade.112 In Helsinki, in late 1973, Chilean exiles 
participated in the creation of an International Commission of Enquiry into the Crimes 
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of the Military Junta, spearheaded by Scandinavian countries, sponsored by the USSR’s 
World Peace Council, and comprising twenty-seven countries. At subsequent meetings in 
Copenhagen (1974), Mexico City (1975), Helsinki (1976), this transnational organization 
placed human rights at the forefront of its concerns when it came to opposing the 
dictatorship. As Patrick Kelly argues, as well as reflecting on the concrete crisis of human 
rights in Chile, its depoliticized language also avoided partisan struggles on the Left.113 
Moreover, focusing on human rights combined the twin goals of mobilizing global 
opposition to the Junta and saving lives. This was effective when it came to campaigns to 
free political prisoners inside Chile, with the dictatorship increasingly using mass exile as 
a way of closing down concentration camps that had been criticized.114 The international 
solidarity movement, with active involvement of the Comité Chileno, also had an impact 
on individual cases: for example, helping ensure the release of Carmen Castillo, Miguel 
Enriquez’s partner, arrested in late 1974.115 
When it came to the campaign against the dictatorship’s human rights violations, 
those working at the Comité Chileno in Havana mostly focused their attention on the 
United Nations. Specifically, they were able to work through Cuba’s delegation in New 
York, to help promote a resolution condemning the Junta for human rights violations.116 
On 6 November 1974, after intense campaigning, 90 countries voted in favor of the 
Resolution 3219 that condemned “constant flagrant violations of basic human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in Chile” against 8 votes with 26 abstentions.117 Evidence of the 
significance and strength of this “correlation of forces” was the fact that the United 
States had been forced to abstain, Beatriz reported.118  
Chilean exiles celebrated the UN vote as the “hardest blow to the Junta” since 
the coup. “The Junta’s representative was extremely isolated,” Beatriz recounted, “he 
ended up attacking the whole commission, including representatives of western 
countries.”119 Writing to Arrate in Rome after the vote took place, she argued that it 
demonstrated the value in an internationally “broad front” against the dictatorship.120 
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When Arrate distributed a schedule for solidarity work in 1975, focusing on securing 
freedom for political prisoners, demanding an end of torture, and the dictatorship’s state 
of siege, he underlined the importance of “work that can be carried out in terms of the 
United Nations and its agencies.”121  
The written word – in the form of reports, bulletins and secret documents 
smuggled out of Chile illuminating the dictatorship’s methods – became increasingly 
valuable for this kind of international work and for keeping up the momentum of 
opposition to the dictatorship. Following Resolution 3219, the UN established a unique 
Ad Hoc Working Group to investigate human rights in Chile. Alongside non-Chilean 
human rights activists, the Comité Chileno – with Cuban funds – helped ensure 
witnesses travelled to Geneva or New York to testify to this Group and collated 
information for it. 122 In doing so, Kelly argues, Chilean exiles powerfully helped 
communicate the effects of state-led terror and define a new international human rights 
agenda.123 “Acquired experience in diplomatic work,” Beatriz wrote to a fellow exile, 
“indicates that things are greatly facilitated if materials are provided that affirm what is 
being briefly stated.”124 The Comité Chileno frequently provided Alarcón with 
information on numbers and names of the detained and disappeared, together with lists 
of concentration camps and torture centers for his work at the UN. The Cuban delegate 
also asked for, and received, information on the relationships that existed between the 
Junta and Apartheid South Africa or Israel, perceiving these to be particularly useful for 
gaining support in the UN General Assembly. Meanwhile, the Comité Chileno sent 
written reports on the Junta’s female victims to the United Nation’s “International Year 
of the Woman” conference in Mexico in 1975.125  
In fact, Mexico City increasingly became a key route for the dissemination of 
information and the location of exile-led solidarity work. Having been established in 
September 1974, Casa Chile in Mexico City became a key partner for the Comité 
Chileno. That Mexico was in Latin America, part of a global South force in international 
affairs, nominally non-aligned, and home to over 3,000 exiles, including Beatriz’s mother 
and sisters, made it particularly attractive as a location for international conferences and 
Chilean solidarity activities.126 Paid for by the Mexican government, with an annual 
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budget of nearly $13,000 dollars by 1978, Casa Chile also had the resources to facilitate 
diplomatic work.127 From 1975, the Comité Chileno took advantage of these resources 
and Mexico’s easier communication routes with the outside world than Cuba – 
particularly in reaching the United States – by outsourcing large printing runs to Mexico 
of its materials.128 Primarily, this meant outsourcing the Comité Chileno’s Bulletin, Chile 
Informativo, which had constituted one of the principal sources of information about Chile 
throughout Latin America and the United States since late 1973. As each copy of the 
Bulletin noted, it represented the Chilean Left based in Havana and collaboration with 
Cuba’s news agency, Prensa Latina. Its aim was to distribute information from inside 
Chile and to coordinate suggestions for resistance work in the exterior.129 The Bulletin 
became an important focus of the Comité Chileno’s work and the coordinated exile-led 
resistance efforts between Cuba and Mexico from 1975 onward.  
Alongside the topic of human rights, one of the most repeated messages in this 
Bulletin and the Comité Chileno’s reports was the link between the United States – or 
“imperialism”– and the dictatorship.130 This narrative – and its dissemination – was 
considered an important anti-Junta weapon. It aimed to pressure the U.S. government 
into reducing economic, military, and political support for the Junta. And the climate 
within Washington was receptive. Already before 1973, congressional investigations into 
covert intervention against Allende’s government had begun. Following the coup, 
Democratic Senators such as Ted Kennedy, Thomas Harkin, and Frank Church, and 
Democratic Representative, Michael J. Harrington, had then campaigned to stop US 
military assistance to the Junta and impose economic sanctions on the grounds of human 
rights violations.  
Beyond distributing information about the United States’ intervention in Chile 
through the Bulletin, Chilean left-wing exiles directly influenced the way in which these 
congressional efforts played out. In mid-1974, for example, Beatriz had visited 
Washington to lobby congress. As one legislative staff officer on Capitol Hill reflected, 
this kind of visit was “eminently useful…Chileans can tell it like it is in a way that North 
American lobbyists cannot possibly hope to do. And meeting them is also educational 
for lobbyists who are then armed with convincing arguments when we meet hostile 
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questioning and unsympathetic questions.” The visit served to “reconfirm and re-
enthuse…friends to take particular note of Chile when it comes to the Foreign Aid Bill” 
and “present some striking evidence…to uncommitted skeptics.”131  
From 1975 until 1976, the Chilean Left could also count on Orlando Letelier, 
whose presence in Washington was pivotal in mobilizing support against the Junta. A PS 
militant who had worked for the Inter-American Development Bank in the 1960s and 
been Allende’s ambassador to Washington, he was particularly well connected. As Arrate 
wrote to him in June 1975, “since your arrival, things have improved noticeably.”132 
Beatriz similarly found it “extremely useful” to be in contact with him, receive 
information about U.S. domestic politics, and send the Comité’s published materials to 
him for distribution. As she wrote optimistically in 1975, their combined efforts at the 
United States and the UN could help overcome the PS’ “tragic” position inside Chile.133 
To this end, Letelier worked closely with Cuba’s representative at the United Nations, 
Ricardo Alarcón.134 Beatriz also sent Letelier $5,000 from the PS’ share of solidarity 
funds in May 1975 calculated to last five months, and roughly $1000 a month after this 
for his solidarity work.135  
These international campaigns hurt the dictatorship in a way that the fragile 
resistance in Chile could not. For one, U.S. domestic political pressure reduced military 
and economic assistance for Chile, damaging U.S.-Chilean bilateral relations in turn. 
When Chile’s ambassador in Washington unsuccessfully begged the U.S. to vote against 
the UN resolution condemning human rights violations, this also reflected the regime’s 
growing isolation.136 The dictatorship’s refusal to moderate its repression in the face of 
international pressure did not help. When Pinochet cancelled a UN visit to Chile in 1975 
to investigate human rights, State Department officials complained this made “any 
attempts to assist that country in international fora and congress difficult if not 
impossible.137  
Meanwhile, Chile’s military leaders appear to have been hysterical about 
international opposition. As one Chilean diplomat put it in October 1974, “the 
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battlefront has moved outside Chile’s borders.” 138 The military regime also believed it 
was losing this battle. Ignoring systemic weaknesses of left-wing parties inside Chile and 
the profound military asymmetry between the Junta and the Chilean Left, the 
dictatorship considered its opponents to have a more “favorable terrain” on which to 
operate internationally (i.e. more resources, superior propaganda capabilities, “abundant 
finance,” hegemony within the Third World).139 As the Chilean ambassador in 
Washington described, the Junta faced a “psychological war” against it.140 Quite apart 
from congressional military sanctions, Washington’s refusal to vote against the UN 
resolution condemning human rights in Chile had “very seriously” undermined Chile’s 
position. Seen from Santiago, the Junta’s international position had become very 
difficult.141  
Chilean diplomats therefore repeatedly called for a counteroffensive. As Chile’s 
representative at the UN told his U.S. counterpart, Santiago would continue fighting 
communism even if it had to do so alone.142 This included hiring prestigious agencies to 
launch public relations campaigns, the publication of the Junta’s very own Bulletin to 
counter the Comité Chileno’s, and bilateral diplomacy to undercut collective action in 
international forums. The Junta also sent $5,000 to the Chilean embassy in Sweden 
shortly after Beatriz’s visit in December 1973 for cultural activities to “neutralize” Chile’s 
image and counter “Marxist infiltration” of the press.143 When it came to human rights, 
there were apparently no attempts to take concerns at face value. Regarding the issue as a 
smokescreen for ulterior motives, the dictatorship simply opted for outright denial and 
counterattacks against the socialist bloc’s human rights record.144  
The number of alarmist strategy papers relating to this counteroffensive confirm 
the Chilean Left’s own perception that it was putting substantial pressure on the Junta 
through its international strategies. “We are doing very well,” Letelier wrote to Beatriz in 
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March 1976, noting that support for solidarity campaigns had increased in the United 
States and the Junta’s isolation was growing.145 Unable to defend their human rights 
record or effectively counter its growing isolation, the dictatorship therefore opted for 
extreme measures, sanctioning international terrorism as part of Operation Condor from 
the end of 1975 onward.  
Pivotally, on 21 September 1976, the Junta struck directly at Chilean exile-led 
opposition by killing Letelier in a car bomb in central Washington D.C. Letelier’s death 
was devastating blow to the Chilean Left, especially at a time when the it was already 
reeling from the effects of the military’s repression within Chile and its surveillance of 
exile activities abroad.146 Not only did it remove a key figure in a growing Chilean-led 
transnational solidarity network spread between Cuba, Mexico, the United States, and the 
United Nations, but it also revealed the uphill struggle opponents of the regime faced 
against a fanatical dictatorship bent on murdering its enemies.  
Within Chile, the dictatorship meanwhile strove hard to paint exiles like Letelier 
as “foreign,” “anti-Chilean” threats and mobilize support for itself based on a new 
extreme version of Chilean nationalism that equated citizenship with loyalty to the 
dictatorship. The connection between Chilean exiles and the socialist bloc, and Cuba in 
particular, which had been so vital to the continued viability and existence of the Chilean 
Left in these years after the coup, was also used to great effect by an anti-communist 
dictatorship that saw itself as waging war on “foreign Marxism.” Under the headline “La 
Connexión Cubana,” El Mercurio published old letters from Beatriz found in Letelier’s 
briefcase and seized by the FBI that discussed the money she was sending him and the 
dissemination of anti-Junta materials at the UN. Using her location in Havana, the paper 
claimed she was acting as a Cuban operative and that the “Kremlin’s hand was behind 
Letelier’s campaign.”147 In this respect, exile-led solidarity strategies abroad (and 
particularly those directed from Cuba) could sometimes rebound and undermine the 
Left’s legitimacy inside Chile, providing evidence of concrete left-wing campaigns that 
counted on socialist countries’ support. 
Beatriz was one of those who understood this dilemma and grew increasingly 
disheartened by exiles’ ability to change the situation in Chile. For over a year before 
Letelier’s assassination, she had been trying to resign from her position as manager of the 
Chilean Left’s bank accounts. Not only was she concerned with what happened to 
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money she transferred to Chile, but her correspondence reveals a growing dispute 
between the Havana and Rome offices related to the latter’s failure to keep accurate 
records of European donations and deposit funds in the Luxembourg account for 
transfer to Cuba. As she repeatedly told Altamirano, she no longer wanted the Allende 
name to be associated with these funds if they were not managed responsibly.148 The 
bleak situation in Chile by 1977 and the Cubans’ refusal to help her train to go back and 
take part in an armed insurgency despite repeated requests added to her sense a despair 
that characterized this first, desperate phase of resistance to the dictatorship. When 
General Augusto Pinochet outlined the future institutionalization of the military regime 
in July 1977, any remaining hopes of an early end to the dictatorship that existed were 
crushed. As Beatriz remarked to one of her Chilean friends in Havana in October that 
year, “with Chile, there is nothing that can be done.”149 Having withdrawn from the 
Comité Chileno in earlier that year and handed the management of bank accounts over 
to Francisco Fernández, she committed suicide on 11 October 1977.150    
Had she waited a year, Beatriz would have had reason to be more optimistic, 
although the situation was far from positive. In 1978, left-wing parties were encouraged 
by what they observed as growing local opposition to the dictatorship inside Chile.151 
This was the beginning of mass mobilization in Chile that would grow in the early 1980s 
and give parties – inside Chile and abroad – oppositional strength. The year 1978 was 
also the beginning of the MIR’s “Operation Retorno” which infiltrated exiles back into 
Chile to lead an insurgency. Meanwhile, the PS split in two in 1979 and the PCCH veered 
from political resistance as part of an anti-fascist front to emphasis on “Popular Mass 
Rebellion” and armed insurgency.  
Beatriz’s death was therefore one of the events that marked the end of the first 
phase of resistance to the dictatorship and the beginning of a new one. It also resulted in 
a change for the Comité Chileno’s significance. Francisco Fernández’s subsequently left 
Cuba for Mexico and the committee lost much of its prestige and centrality in the 
international network of exile-led committees.152 This also dovetailed with Cuba’s own 
shifting role in opposing the Junta. Beatriz’s death ended the personal link between the 
Chilean exiles and the Cuban authorities born out of loyalty to her father and her own 
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intimate ties going back to the late 1960s. The reformulation of left-wing parties in the 
second phase of resistance, with some factions shifting towards an emphasis on social 
democracy and others to renewed attention to armed struggle, also meant that the idea of 
a collective Left in exile faded. For many Chileans in Western Europe, like those who 
formed the new social democratic wing of the PS, extended exile led to the 
reconceptualization of political identities and the downgrading of past Marxist 
affiliations. With Mexico assuming a greater role in the Americas, and Paris, Rotterdam, 
and Rome becoming the preferred location for reformulated social democratic sectors of 
the Left after 1979, the Cuban leadership’s relevance as a unique authority and arbiter 
between all different Chilean left-wing parties also changed. To be sure, contacts with 
Cuba were maintained, but they were largely conducted at a party level rather than via the 
Comité Chileno. With the situation in Chile improving as far as locally based opposition 
to the dictatorship, they also now shifted to the kind of training and clandestine support 
armed insurgency efforts that the Cubans had denied early on. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
An examination of Chilean left-wing solidarity efforts from Cuba between 1973 and 1977 
illustrates the enormity of the task that exiles faced immediately after the coup as well as 
the sheer intensity of their efforts. This is not to say that these represented coherent 
strategies or a clear vision for Chile’s future. As we have seen, the Chilean Left was 
profoundly divided, as it had been before 1973, but now with growing intensity. At least 
for those in charge of the Comité Chileno in Havana that tried to collectively represent 
these tendencies on the Left and mobilize broad-based opposition to the dictatorship, 
solidarity in the first years after the coup meant using every available strategy at once.  
In charting these different overlapping strategies, this article has sought to shed 
light on exile-led resistance from Havana, Cuba’s role in facilitating this opposition to the 
dictatorship, and the relationship that it had with global solidarity networks after 1973.  
As we have seen, there were obviously limits to what Chilean political exiles could do in 
this first phase. Cuba’s reluctance – probably wisely – to send Chileans immediately back 
home to partake in an armed insurgency meant that more cadres had to oppose the 
dictatorship from abroad. Yet problems of communication, infiltration by the 
dictatorship’s intelligence services, and the collapse of internal resistance and left-wing 
party structures inside the country made it immensely difficult for those in exile to make 
a difference on the ground in Chile. Internal divisions between and within parties - trying 
to operate from inside the country as well as from exile – added to these challenges. 
While limited in what they achieved, exile-led efforts, like those from Havana 
carried out by the Comité Chileno with Cuban support, nevertheless provided a platform 
on which subsequent opposition to the Junta could build. At a direct level, Chilean 
political parties – represented abroad by exile committees such as the Comité Chileno in 
Havana – provided the essential conduits for global solidarity activism; a means of 
translating it into concrete action. Left-wing parties were thus able to remain central to 
the struggle against the Junta, even if they were increasingly targeted by the dictatorship 
and fragmented. Although solidarity campaigns would increasingly channel money to 
Chilean church groups, educational institutions, or civil society organizations in later 
years, at least in the initial years after the coup, the Chilean Left was the principal 
recipient of funds in these early years and the framer of opposition. And in this respect, 
Beatriz’s role in managing finances from Cuba, and Cuba’s assistance in channeling 
money back to Chile was important, even if the amount that eventually reached Chile 
was never perceived as being enough. The Comité Chileno was also able to shape the 
way in which solidarity was framed through its dissemination of information, and its 
members’ active participation in international campaigns. As Margaret Power has argued, 
the Chile solidarity movement was “successful…in both symbolic and practical terms. 
One of the most important markers was its long-term ability to impact public 
perceptions, influence cultural productions, and affect media coverage of the Pinochet 
dictatorship.”153  
Chilean left-wing exiles’ cooperation with friendly governments, parties, and non-
governmental organizations was thus vital for the increasingly internationalized battle 
they fought. Overall, from the perspective of Chileans on all sides, the outside world and 
its interaction with their own ideas, beliefs and agendas therefore mattered a great deal. 
In this regard, Chile was a special case but not unique. As Cold War conflicts increasingly 
uprooted peoples around the world, particularly from the Third World, it forced them to 
seek refuge abroad, devise new means of communicating their ideas and pursuing their 
political agendas, and find international allies willing to help them. These networks, the 
internationalization of local struggles, and the fluidity of global interconnections that 
crisscrossed oceans and national borders therefore became an increasingly common 
feature of twentieth century global politics. Studying them is imperative if we are to 
                                                        
153 Power, “The U.S. Movement in Solidarity with Chile in the 1970s,” 47. 
understand the full dimensions of Latin America’s history during the late Cold War era. 
Understanding the view from Havana and early resistance to the Chilean dictatorship 
helps identify these struggles’ means and processes along with the global implications 
they had, even during periods of profound defeat and readjustment. It also contributes to 
recovering the broader history of the battle for Chile that began before 1973 and 
continued throughout the dictatorship until democracy was finally restored in 1990.  
 
 
